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We study hybrid logics with nominals and ‘actuality’ operators @i .
We recall the method of ten Cate, Marx, and Viana to simulate hybrid logic using
modalities and ‘nice’ frames, and we show that the hybrid logic of a class of frames is the
modal logic of the class of its corresponding nice frames. We also extend this deﬁnition to
‘fairly nice frames’, to capture their closure under disjoint union.
Using these results, we show how to axiomatize the hybrid logic of any elementary class
of frames.
Then we study quasimodal logics, which are hybrid logics axiomatized by modal axioms
together with basic hybrid axioms common to any hybrid logic, using only orthodox
inference rules. We show that the hybrid logic of any elementary modally deﬁnable class
of frames, or of any elementary class of frames closed under disjoint unions, bounded
morphic images, ultraproducts and generated subframes, is quasimodal. We also show
that the hybrid analogues of modal logics studied by McKinsey–Lemmon and Hughes are
quasimodal.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The broad aim of this paper is to study the process of axiomatizing hybrid logics, using modal methods. There are two
main strands. First, we generalize to hybrid logic the method of [6] for axiomatizing the modal logic of any elementary class
of Kripke frames. Second, we begin a study of how we can axiomatize the hybrid logic of a class K of frames if we are given
the modal logic of K as ‘free’ axioms.
Different approaches have been taken in the literature to try to axiomatize the hybrid logic of a class of frames. For
example, we can ﬁnd in [2] axiomatizations for the hybrid logic with operator @ alone, @ and ↓, @ and ∀, etc. The axiom-
atizations for @ use ‘non-orthodox’ Burgess–Gabbay-style inference rules, such as Name and BG, and cover only classes of
frames deﬁnable by pure formulas (i.e., hybrid formulas containing no propositional variables, but only nominals). Further
classes of frames can be covered by adding more non-orthodox rules.
In [3], the authors give a slightly different way to axiomatize the hybrid logic of a class of frames characterized by a
set of pure formulas. However, the axiomatization is done from scratch: even though hybrid logic is based on modal logic,
this axiomatization does not directly take advantage of modal completeness theorems. Moreover, if pure axioms are present,
extra ‘non-orthodox’ inference rules are still needed to make the axiomatization complete.
An interesting result can be found in [10]. In this article, a theorem states that any class of frames deﬁned by Sahlqvist
formulas can be axiomatized in a way that uses modal completeness theorems, and reﬂects the fact that hybrid logic is
based on modal logic. Indeed, the axioms of the hybrid logics studied in this article are clearly divided into modal axioms
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case. [10] also shows that pure and Sahlqvist axioms cannot be readily combined. So there are limits to the classes of frames
that are covered.
As we can see, there are two gaps in these results. First, we know that we can axiomatize the class of all frames, any
class of frames axiomatized by modal Sahlqvist formulas, and any class of frames deﬁned by pure sentences (if we add
extra rules). We would like to be able to axiomatize more classes of frames, preferably using only orthodox inference rules.
To this end, we use nice frames, which have been proposed by ten Cate et al. (in [10]) as a way to simulate hybrid operators
using modal logic. Using classes of nice frames, we show how to axiomatize, with orthodox rules, the hybrid logic of any
elementary class of frames.
Second, we would like to separate, in an axiomatization, the hybrid part from the modal part. We would like to know
when it is possible to make the axiomatization reﬂect the fact that hybrid logic is based on modal logic, and when we
cannot. So we study the following question: given a class of frames, and its modal axiomatization, what further axioms do
we need to axiomatize the hybrid logic of this class? A ﬁrst step towards an answer will be presented as quasimodal classes,
in Section 5. These are classes of frames whose hybrid logic is axiomatized by their modal logic together with only basic
hybrid axioms, expressing the meaning of the hybrid operators and valid in all frames. We give some criteria for a class to
be quasimodal, and consider some examples, including interesting classes of frames whose modal logics were introduced
and studied by McKinsey–Lemmon and Hughes.
1.1. Scope of this paper
In this paper, the modal signature is a single box with accessibility relation noted R . The hybrid logic we deal with is
H(@), i.e., the hybrid logic with nominals and ‘actuality’ operators @i . We do not study operators such as ↓, ∃, etc.
1.2. Layout of paper
For convenience, and to ﬁx notation, in Section 2 we recall some standard deﬁnitions. In Section 3, we present and
extend nice frames, which have been proposed by ten Cate et al. (in [10]) as a way to simulate hybrid operators using
modal logic. We also extend this notion to study the closure of nice frames under disjoint union, in what we call fairly nice
frames (Section 3.4). These results will be used ﬁrst in Section 4, to axiomatize the hybrid logic of any elementary class
of frames, and then extended in Section 5, to study the hybrid axiomatization of classes of frames when a known modal
axiomatization is given. Finally, in Section 6, we apply results of this latter section to modal logics studied by McKinsey–
Lemmon and Hughes.
Sections 5 and 6 do not rely on Section 4.
2. Basic deﬁnitions
We assume familiarity with modal logic ([3] has ample information). Here, we recall the basics of hybrid logic, and set
up some notation. (For readers seeking more recent information on hybrid proof theory, we suggest [2].) Throughout, we ﬁx
a countably inﬁnite set P of propositional letters, and a countable non-empty set N of nominals. Any element of P ∪N is
a hybrid H(@)-formula, as is ; if φ,ψ are H(@)-formulas, so are ¬φ, φ ∧ ψ , and φ; and if i ∈ N then @iφ is also an
H(@)-formula. No other things are hybrid H(@)-formulas.
Semantics of H(@)-formulas is given by models of the form M = 〈W , R, V 〉, where 〈W , R〉 is a Kripke frame and
V : P ∪ N → ℘(W ) (here, ℘ denotes power set) is a valuation such that |V (i)| = 1 for each i ∈ N . We write the hybrid
satisfaction relation as |h in order to distinguish it from ordinary modal evaluation which we write as |m . For w ∈ W
and an H(@)-formula φ, we deﬁne M,w |h φ by induction on φ: for x ∈ P ∪ N , we let M,w |h x iff w ∈ V (x); the
boolean connectives are handled as usual; M,w |h φ iff M, v |h φ for every v with (w, v) ∈ R; and M,w |h @iφ iff
M, v |h φ, where V (i) = {v}. An H(@)-formula φ is valid in M if M,w |h φ for all worlds w of M, valid in a frame F if
it is valid in all models with frame F, and valid in a class K of frames if it is valid in all frames in K . We use the notations
M |h φ, F |h φ, K |h φ, respectively, for these notions.
Notation. For a set S of modal formulas and a modal formula φ, we write S m φ if φ is provable using as axioms all
propositional tautologies, normality of  (i.e., (p → q) → (p →q)), and formulas in S , and using the standard inference
rules of modus ponens, substitution, and box-generalization (from φ, derive φ). Formally, S being a set of modal formulas,
and φ a modal formula, if S m φ, then any set of modal formulas containing the axioms and closed under the rules
contains φ.1 We will deﬁne a hybrid variant h later (Deﬁnition 3.8).
1 Warning: this notation is not standard. We are not using it to mean that m σ1 ∧ · · · ∧ σn → φ for some σ1, . . . , σn ∈ S . For example, for distinct
p,q ∈P , we have {p} m q in our notation but not in this one.
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As hybrid logic is close to modal logic, it would be interesting if one could apply modal theorems to hybrid logic. Ten
Cate et al. have, in [10], deﬁned nice frames, which give a way to simulate hybrid operators using modal logic, and so to
apply results from modal logic to hybrid logic. In this section, we extend this method.
3.1. Nice frames
We recall here how [10] proposed to treat hybrid operators as modalities.
Deﬁnition 3.1. (From [10, §3].) A non-standard frame is a frame of the form F= 〈W , R, (Ri)i∈N , (Si)i∈N 〉, where R and the
Ri are binary relations on W , and Si are unary relations on W .
This is in contrast with what we will call standard frames, which are ordinary Kripke frames of the form 〈W , R〉. The idea
behind non-standard frames is that for any nominal i, @i is treated as a unary modality with accessibility relation Ri , and i
is treated as a nullary modality with accessibility relation Si . Thus, the semantics associated to non-standard frames is:
M,w |m i iff w ∈ Si,





) ⇒ M,w ′ |m φ
)
,
where w is a world of a model M based on a non-standard frame.
A non-standard frame is said to be nice if for each i ∈ N , Si is a singleton and ∀xy(Ri(x, y) ↔ Si(y)) is true. A model is
said to be non-standard (respectively nice) if its frame is non-standard (resp. nice).
The following lemma shows that evaluating a formula in a nice frame is, in a certain sense, equivalent to evaluating it
in the hybrid valuation.
Lemma 3.2. (From [10, Lemma 3.2].) Let Mm = 〈W , R, (Ri)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , Vm〉 be a nice model, where Vm : P → ℘(W ), and let
Mh = 〈W , R, Vh〉 (where Vh = Vm ∪ {(i, Si) | i ∈ N }) be its corresponding hybrid model. Then, for any world w ∈ W and hybrid
formula φ , we have:
Mh,w |h φ iff Mm,w |m φ.
Deﬁnition 3.3. (From [10, §2].) We call  the following set of axioms, for all i, j ∈ N and p ∈ P (we also give their ﬁrst-
order correspondent):
(agree) @i p →@ j@i p ∀xyz(R j(x, y)∧ Ri(y, z) → Ri(x, z)),
(propagation) @i p →@i p ∀xyz(R(x, y)∧ Ri(y, z) → Ri(x, z)),
(elimination) (@i p ∧ i) → p ∀x(Si(x) → Ri(x, x)),
(ref) @i i ∀xy(Ri(x, y) → Si(y)),
(self-dual) @i p ↔ ¬@i¬p ∀x∃!y(Ri(x, y)).
We now extend [10, Lemma 3.3].
Lemma 3.4. For any non-standard frame F, F is nice iff F is weakly connected (i.e., there exists a path between any two worlds using
any relation or reverse relation of F) and F validates .
Proof. The left-to-right direction is obvious: once we noticed that a nice frame is weakly connected (any two worlds x
and y are connected by relations Ri(x, i) and R
−1
i (i, y), where i is an arbitrary nominal), it is easy to prove the ﬁrst-order
correspondents of  (which are given in the previous deﬁnition) from the deﬁnition of niceness.
For the right-to-left direction, consider F= 〈W , R, (Ri), (Si)〉, a weakly connected frame validating . Let us show that
it is nice. We use here the ﬁrst-order correspondents of the axioms .
First, we want to show that for all x, y, we have Ri(x, y) iff Si(y). The left-to-right direction is the axiom ‘ref ’. The
right-to-left direction is less obvious.
Let x and y be two worlds such that Si(y). As x and y are weakly connected, there exists a sequence (tm)mn , for a
ﬁnite n, where x = t0, y = tn and Rm(tm−1, tm) where 1m  n and Rm is one of the relations R , R−1, R j , R−1j for any
nominal j.
We show by induction that for all m, we have Ri(tm, y). The base case is given by the ‘elimination’ axiom: Ri(tn, y).
Then, suppose we have Ri(tm, y). The previous element tm−1 in the sequence can be related to tm in four different ways.
• R(tm−1, tm) By the axiom ‘propagation’, we get Ri(tm−1, y).
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‘self-dual’ again, y = y′ , and so, we have Ri(tm−1, y).
• R j(tm−1, tm) By the axiom ‘agree’, we get Ri(tm−1, y).
• R j(tm, tm−1) By the axiom ‘self-dual’, there exists y′ such that Ri(tm−1, y′). With ‘agree’, we get Ri(tm, y′). But by
‘self-dual’ again, y = y′ , and so, we have Ri(tm−1, y).
At last, by induction, we get Ri(x, y).
Now we have to show that Si is a singleton. By ‘self-dual’, Si is not empty. Suppose now that there exist y and z such
that Si(y) and Si(z). Let x be any world. We just proved that we have Ri(x, y) and Ri(x, z). Therefore, by ‘self-dual’, y and
z are the same world. Si is a singleton. 
3.2. Hybrid extension
An important limitation of nice frames is that evaluation of nominals is bound to the frame, whereas in hybrid logic, it
is bound to the model. So, a hybrid formula valid, in the non-standard semantics, in a frame, is only valid, in the hybrid
semantics, in some of the models that can be built over this frame: those that agree on the valuation of the nominals. The
idea we develop here to solve this problem is to consider, in the same class of nice frames, all the possible evaluations of
nominals of a given modal frame. This will be done in hybrid extensions.
Before deﬁning this extension, we give the following notations. Given a class K of standard frames, we call ML(K ) the
modal logic of K : that is, the set of all modal formulas valid in K . The logic HL(K ) is the hybrid logic of K . At last, L being
a class of non-standard frames, NS(L) (for Non-Standard) is the hybrid logic that is valid in L in the non-standard semantics,
i.e., NS(L) is the set of hybrid formulas valid in L when @i and i (for all i ∈ N ) are interpreted as modalities.
In other words:
ML(K ) = {modal formulas φ: K |m φ},
HL(K ) = {hybrid H(@)-formulas φ : K |h φ
}
,
NS(L) = {hybrid H(@)-formulas φ : L |m φ
}
.
Deﬁnition 3.5. Let K be a class of standard frames. The hybrid extension of K is the class H(K ) of nice frames that can be
built over K :
H(K ) = {nice frames 〈W , R, (Ri)i∈N , (Si)i∈N
〉
such that 〈W , R〉 ∈ K}.
Let F= 〈W , R, (Ri)i∈N , (Si)i∈N 〉 be a non-standard frame. The modal reduct of F is the standard frame FM = 〈W , R〉.
Given this deﬁnition, Lemma 3.2, which described in which sense we can consider that non-standard and modal seman-
tics are equivalent, can be extended to classes.
Theorem 3.6. For all classes K of standard frames, the hybrid logic of K is the modal logic of H(K ):
NS
(H(K ))= HL(K ).
Proof (Sketch).2 We know by Lemma 3.2 that evaluating a formula in a non-standard model or in the corresponding hybrid
model are equivalent. From this, we can show a similar result with class of frames, that is: K being a class of standard
frames, and φ a hybrid formula, K |h φ iff H(K ) |m φ. Then, it is straightforward to extend this result to a whole logic
instead of a single formula, and we get NS(H(K )) = HL(K ). 
We show in the next theorem that hybrid extensions also preserve the fact that a class is elementary. We introduce
notation | f which describes ﬁrst-order evaluation.
Theorem 3.7. K being an elementary class of standard frames, its hybrid extension H(K ) is elementary.
Proof. Suppose K = {F: F | f T }, where T is a ﬁrst-order theory in the signature {R}, and let K ′ be the class of non-




{∀xy(Ri(x, y) ↔ Si(y)
)
, ∀xy((Si(x)∧ Si(y)
)→ x = y), ∃xSi(x)
}
.
2 You can ﬁnd in [9] the full proofs of some propositions and theorems for which we only give sketches or omit proofs in this paper.
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(⊇) By deﬁnition, frames of H(K ) are nice, so they validate H . By deﬁnition, K validates T , so, H(K ) validates T as well
(H(K ) only adds relations to K , that do not occur in T ). So H(K ) ⊆ K ′ .
(⊆) Frames of K ′ validate H , so they are nice. They validate T by deﬁnition.
Let F= 〈W , R, (Ri), (Si)〉 be a frame of K ′ . K ′ | f T , so F | f T . But formulas of T are ﬁrst-order formulas that do not
use Ri and Si , so FM | f T as well. Thus, FM ∈ K , by deﬁnition, and, as F is nice, F ∈ H(K ). 
The converse theorem is also true, but we will not use it in this article, and the proof is longer. It can be found in [9].
3.3. Hybrid and non-standard modal provability
These notions will be needed in the following sections.
Deﬁnition 3.8. For a set S of H(@)-formulas and an H(@)-formula φ, we write S h φ if φ is provable using as axioms
all propositional tautologies, normality of  and @i (i ∈ N ), and formulas in S ∪ , using the rules modus ponens, sorted
substitution (if φ is derivable then so is any formula built from φ by uniformly replacing proposition letters by arbitrary
formulas and nominals by nominals), box-generalization, and @-generalization (from φ, derive @iφ for any i ∈ N ). This
system is as in [10]. (See footnote 1.)
We write S nsm φ if S m φ when nominals and @is are regarded as nullary (respectively, unary) modalities. (So the
axioms and rules of m of Section 2 are augmented by normality and generalization for each @i .)
To remind ourselves that  is included as basic axioms of h , we will often say that a hybrid logic of the form {φ ∈
H(@): Λ h φ} is axiomatized by Λ∪.
Lemma 3.9. Let S be a set of H(@)-formulas that is closed under substitution of nominals in its formulas (that is, if φ ∈ S then φ′ ∈ S
for any φ′ obtained from φ by substitution of nominals for nominals). Let φ an H(@)-formula. The following are equivalent:
(i) S h φ ,
(ii) S ∪ nsm φ .
Proof. The only difference between S ∪  nsm and S h is that substitution of nominals for nominals is an inference rule
of only the latter. Still, an easy induction on length of a formal proof will show that if S ∪  nsm φ then S h φ, and if
S h φ then S ∪  nsm φ′ for any φ′ obtained from φ by substitution of nominals for nominals. This is enough to prove the
lemma. 
3.4. Fairly nice frames
Nice frames have a big limitation. Although, as we will prove in this part, niceness is preserved under bounded morphic
image, generated subframe and ultraroot, it is not preserved under disjoint union.
In this part, we deﬁne fairly nice frames, which seem interesting for several reasons. First, the image of a fairly nice frame
by disjoint union remains fairly nice. Then validity of  characterizes these frames.
Let us study preservation of niceness under some classical frame constructions.
Lemma 3.10. Niceness is preserved under bounded morphic image, generated subframe, ultraroot and ultraproduct, but is not, in
general, preserved under disjoint union.
Sketch of proof. Bounded morphic image and generated subframe: The proof is a simple application of the deﬁnition of
these operations.
Ultraroot and ultraproduct: Niceness can be deﬁned by ﬁrst-order sentences, so by Łos´’s theorem, it is preserved by these
operations.
Disjoint union: by deﬁnition, a nice frame is weakly connected. So the disjoint union of at least two frames is not
nice. 
Since disjoint union does not preserve niceness, we introduce the following deﬁnition to deal with it.
Deﬁnition 3.11. A non-standard frame is said to be fairly nice if it is the disjoint union of nice frames.
It is easily seen that fairly niceness is preserved by the frame constructions we use in the previous lemma, including
disjoint union.
We now give a non-standard characterization of fairly niceness.
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Proof. (⇒) By deﬁnition, a fairly nice frame F is the union of nice frames, which validate  (by Lemma 3.4). As non-
standard validity is preserved by disjoint union, F validates  as well.
(⇐) Let F be a non-standard frame validating . We consider it as the union of some weakly connected frames (possibly
a single frame if F itself is weakly connected). Each of these weakly connected frames validates , since each of these frames
can be seen as a generated subframe of F. By Lemma 3.4, each of these frames is nice, so F is fairly nice. 
Since niceness is not preserved by disjoint union, but this operation preserves modal validity, it is not possible to modally
deﬁne niceness. Fairly niceness is a notion that is both close to niceness, and modally deﬁnable.
4. Elementarily generated hybrid logics
Hodkinson [6] gave a method of constructing an axiomatization of the modal logic of any elementary class of frames. We
will use this result, together with the hybrid extension we just deﬁned, to axiomatize the hybrid logic of any elementary
class of frames.
Theorem 4.1. For any elementary class of frames K , one can construct a set Λ of axioms for HL(K ) from ﬁrst-order sentences deﬁn-
ing K .
Proof. Let K be an elementary class of frames. By Theorem 3.7, we know that H(K ) is elementary. Thus, [6, Theorem 5.16]
says that there exists a modal axiomatization Λ of NS(H(K )), constructed from ﬁrst-order sentences deﬁning H(K ), which
can themselves be constructed from ﬁrst-order sentences deﬁning K (see proof of Theorem 3.7). Formally, NS(H(K )) = {φ ∈
H(@): Λ nsm φ}. This remains true if we close Λ under substitution of nominals for nominals, since by deﬁnition of H(K ),
such substitutions do not affect validity in H(K ).
By Theorem 3.6, NS(H(K )) is the hybrid logic of K . Moreover, NS(H(K )) is an hybrid logic, in the sense that it contains
the axioms  (for frames of H(K ) are nice, so they validate ). So Λ nsm δ for every δ ∈ , which means that ‘Λ nsm ’ is the
same as ‘Λ ∪  nsm ’. Therefore, HL(K ) = NS(H(K )) = {φ ∈ H(@): Λ nsm φ} = {φ ∈ H(@): Λ ∪  nsm φ}. By Lemma 3.9, this
is {φ ∈ H(@): Λ h φ}, as required. 
Of course, the axiomatization we obtain is always inﬁnite, and not always transparent. See [6] for further discussion.
A remark about the result of [6] we use here is necessary. In that paper, the case of nullary modalities is unfortunately
not explicitly considered. We conjecture that the result of [6] can be extended to this case, but formally the existing result
cannot be applied in our situation, as the i are modalities of arity 0. So we simulate i in a different way: we deﬁne the
unary modality i with the following semantics:
F, V , x |m i(φ) iff ∀y if S ′i(x, y) then F, V , y |m φ
where S ′i is deﬁned by: S
′
i(x, y) iff x= y and Si(x).
Then, the nominal i would be written i(), and we would eventually get: F, V , x |m i() iff Si(x).
5. Quasimodal classes
In the previous section, we used hybrid extensions and nice classes to axiomatize any elementary class of frames. In this
section, we use the same tools with a different approach to axiomatize some speciﬁc classes of frames, that we will call
quasimodal classes.
Hybrid logic is deﬁned as a layer over modal logic. However, axiomatization of the hybrid logic of classes of frames is
often done from scratch, without separating modal axioms from hybrid ones.
In this section, we study the hybrid logic of classes of frames whose modal logic is already known. That is, given a class
of frames and its modal axiomatization, which hybrid axioms do we need to add to get the hybrid logic of the same class
of frames? Some classes will only need , which describes the hybrid operators, but some others may need more axioms,
which means that some properties of the frames could not be expressed using modal logic only. So, we obtain a measure
of how much more information than the modal logic is carried by the hybrid logic of the class.
As a ﬁrst attempt, we propose here to study cases where no hybrid axioms are needed, except , which deﬁnes hybrid
logic. In such logics, which will be called quasimodal logics, hybrid semantics does not bring anything more, concerning
axiomatization, than its own deﬁnition.
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(i) An hybrid logic Λ is quasimodal3 if it is axiomatized by Θ ∪ , where Θ is a set of modal axioms (that is, without
nominals or @-operators), and  is the set of hybrid axioms deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.3. Formally, Λ is quasimodal if
there exists a set Θ of modal formulas such that Λ = {φ ∈ H(@): Θ h φ}.
(ii) We say that a class of standard frames is quasimodal if its hybrid logic is quasimodal.
As an attempt to characterize quasimodal classes of frames, we will show in Theorem 5.4 that a class of frames closed
under disjoint union, bounded morphic image, generated subframe and ultraproduct is quasimodal. First we prove a useful
lemma.
Lemma 5.2. Let K be a class of standard frames that contains the canonical frame of ML(K ). Then HL(K ) is quasimodal.
Proof. Let Λ = {φ ∈ H(@): ML(K ) h φ} be the hybrid logic axiomatized by ML(K )∪. We show that Λ = HL(K ).
First, as ML(K ) ⊆ HL(K ), by soundness of h we get: Λ ⊆ HL(K ).
For the converse inclusion, consider a hybrid formula φ not in Λ. Since ML(K )∪ is closed under nominal substitutions,
Lemma 3.9 yields
Λ = {ψ ∈ H(@): ML(K )∪ nsm ψ
}
, (1)
so Λ ∪ {¬φ} is modally consistent in the non-standard sense. Let C be the canonical model of Λ in the language H(@), in
the non-standard sense. Let M be a submodel of C , generated by a world in which ¬φ is true. Let F be the (non-standard)
frame of M. Since  is Sahlqvist and valid in M, it is valid in F. As F is weakly connected, by Lemma 3.4 we see that F is
nice. We know that M does not validate φ in the non-standard modal sense. So by Lemma 3.2, φ is not valid in the modal
reduct FM of F in the hybrid sense (i.e., FM |h φ).
Let Q = P ∪ N ∪ {@iψ: @iψ ∈ H(@)} (we suppose that these three sets are pairwise disjoint). Then Q is countably
inﬁnite, so we may choose a bijection π : Q → P . Now deﬁne, for each ψ ∈ H(@), a modal formula ψ↓, by induction:
ψ↓ = π(ψ) for ψ ∈ P ∪ N , ↓ = , ↓ commutes with the boolean operators and , and (@iψ)↓ = π(@iψ). Also deﬁne,
for each modal formula α, an H(@)-formula α↑, by induction: p↑ = π−1(p) for p ∈ P , ↑ = , and ↑ commutes with the
boolean operators and . So α↑ is a substitution instance of α. These maps extend to sets of formulas in the obvious way,
by w↓ = {ψ↓: ψ ∈ w} and s↑ = {α↑: α ∈ s}. Easy inductions show that ψ↓↑ = ψ and α↑↓ = α for any ψ,α.
Now if α is any modal formula and ML(K ) m α, then α ∈ ML(K ). Therefore, ML(K ) ∪  nsm α↑: indeed, (α,α↑) is a
formal proof of α↑ in this system, since α ∈ML(K )∪, α↑ is a substitution instance of α, and substitution is a rule of nsm .
By (1), α↑ ∈ Λ.
It follows that if w is a world of M then w↓ is consistent in the modal logic ML(K ). For otherwise, there are
ψ1, . . . ,ψn ∈ w such that ML(K ) m ¬(ψ1↓ ∧ · · · ∧ ψn↓). By the above, (¬(ψ1↓ ∧ · · · ∧ ψn↓))↑ = ¬(ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn) ∈ Λ,
contradicting the Λ-consistency of w . Clearly, if α is any modal formula then α↑ ∈ w or ¬(α↑) ∈ w , and so α↑↓ = α ∈ w↓
or (¬(α↑))↓ = ¬α ∈ w↓. Hence, w↓ is maximal consistent in the modal logic ML(K ).
This means that ↓ : w → w↓ is a well deﬁned map from FM into the canonical frame G (say) of ML(K ). The map is
certainly injective, since w↓↑ = w . We claim that it is a bounded morphism. We write R for the canonical accessibility
relation in both FM and G. The ‘forth’ property is clear: if wRu in FM and α ∈ w↓, then (α)↑ =(α↑) ∈ w↓↑ = w , so
α↑ ∈ u and α↑↓ = α ∈ u↓, proving that w↓ R u↓. For the ‘back’ property, suppose that w↓ R s for some w in FM and
s in G. Since s↑↓ = s, it suﬃces to show that s↑ is in FM and w R s↑. Suppose for contradiction that s↑ is inconsistent
with respect to Λ in the non-standard sense. Since s is closed under ∧ and ↑ commutes with ∧, there is α ∈ s such that
¬(α↑) ∈ Λ. By generalization, ¬(α↑) ∈ Λ ⊆ w , and so (¬(α↑))↓ = ¬α ∈ w↓. Since w↓ R s, we obtain ¬α ∈ s, and
since α ∈ s this contradicts the consistency of s. So s↑ is Λ-consistent. Clearly, it is maximal consistent, and so in FM . We
have w R s↑ because if ψ ∈ w then (ψ)↓ =(ψ↓) ∈ w↓, so ψ↓ ∈ s and ψ↓↑ = ψ ∈ s↑. This proves the claim.
So FM is isomorphic to a generated subframe of G. As hybrid H(@)-validity is preserved under generated subframes,
G |h φ. But we are given that G ∈ K . Hence, φ /∈ HL(K ). 
Remark 5.3. Ten Cate et al. proved the following statement in [10, Theorem 3.4]. Let Σ be a set of modal Sahlqvist formulas
not containing nominals or satisfaction operators. Then, the hybrid logic axiomatized by Σ ∪ is sound and strongly complete for the
class of frames deﬁned by Σ . We show that this theorem is a particular case of the previous lemma.
Let K be the class of frames deﬁned by Σ . We show that we can apply Lemma 5.2 on K . By Sahlqvist’s completeness
theorem, the canonical frame for ML(K ) validates Σ , thus this canonical frame is in K . Therefore, by Lemma 5.2, the hybrid
logic of K is axiomatized by ∪Σ . Inspecting the proof of Lemma 5.2 shows that strong completeness can also be proven.
We will not go into the details here.
3 “Quasimodal” logic (and classes) were called “stable” in [9].
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some properties that make a class of frames quasimodal. They show that quasimodal frame classes and hybrid logics are
rather common. We call the three fundamental frame constructions the following operations: generated subframes, bounded
morphic images, and disjoint unions (these operations are known to preserve modal validity).
Theorem 5.4.
(i) If Λ is a canonical modal logic, then the class of all frames that validate Λ is quasimodal.
(ii) A class of frames closed under the three fundamental frame constructions and ultraproducts is quasimodal.
(iii) A modally deﬁnable elementary class of frames is quasimodal.
Proof. Part (i) is immediate from Lemma 5.2.
Let K be a frame matching conditions of (ii). By a result of Goldblatt [4, (4.9), p. 580], the canonical frame of ML(K ) is
in SHUdPuK = K (for a class L of frames, SL, HL, UdL and PuL represent, respectively, the class of generated subframes,
bounded morphic images, disjoint unions, and ultraproducts of frames of L). By Lemma 5.2, K is quasimodal.
Part (iii) follows, since any class of frames satisfying the hypotheses of (iii) also satisﬁes the hypotheses of (ii). 
Remark 5.5. The theorem is not a characterization, as one can easily ﬁnd a quasimodal class that is not modally deﬁnable,
and a quasimodal class that is not closed under the three fundamental operations.
Example 5.6. This theorem can be applied to prove that the following classes of frames are quasimodal: reﬂexive frames,
Euclidean frames, transitive frames, dense frames, symmetric frames, frames validating K4.1, the class of all frames, and the
empty class.
The previous theorem can be used to show the quasimodality of some classes, as we did in the previous example. Here
is a theorem that will be used to prove that some classes are not quasimodal.
Theorem 5.7. Let Λ be the modal logic of the quasimodal class K of frames, and let L be a class of frames containing K and having the
same modal logic Λ.
(i) K and L have the same hybrid logic.
(ii) L is quasimodal.
Proof. (i) (⊇) K ⊆ L, so HL(K ) ⊇ HL(L).
(⊆) As K is quasimodal, its hybrid logic is axiomatized by Λ∪: that is, Λ h HL(K ). But L, by hypothesis, validates Λ.
And by deﬁnition of the hybrid semantics, it validates  as well. Thus, L validates Λ∪, which entails HL(K ). So HL(K ) ⊆
HL(L).
(ii) We just proved that K and L have the same hybrid logic. As K is quasimodal, L is quasimodal as well. 
Two straightforward applications of this theorem will be used to give some examples of non-quasimodal classes.
Corollary 5.8.
(i) K being a class of frames, if there exists a frame that validates ML(K ) and invalidates HL(K ), then K is not quasimodal.
(ii) Let K be a class of frames, and φ a hybrid formula valid in K . If φ is not valid in the closure of K under the three fundamental
operations and ultraroots, then K is not quasimodal.
Proof. (i) Suppose that there exists a frame F that validates ML(K ) but not HL(K ). Then K ∪ {F} has the same modal logic
as K , but not the same hybrid logic. So by Theorem 5.7, K cannot be quasimodal.
(ii) The closure of K under the operations contains K , and these classes have the same modal logic ML(K ), since these
operations preserve modal validity. If K were quasimodal, Theorem 5.7 would be applicable, and K and its closure would
have the same hybrid logic, which is false because of φ. 
We show an application of this corollary in the following example, in which we can use either part (i) or (ii) of the
corollary.
Example 5.9. As i →¬i characterizes irreﬂexivity and is not preserved by bounded morphic images, the class of irreﬂexive
frames is not quasimodal.
By a tree, we mean an acyclic frame that contains a unique root from which each world is accessible, and in which
every world which is not the root has a unique predecessor. The class of all trees is not quasimodal. The formula (@i  k ∧
394 I. Hodkinson, L. Paternault / Journal of Applied Logic 8 (2010) 386–396@ j  k) → @i j (which states that a world cannot have two ancestors) is valid in every tree. However, using the three
fundamental frame constructions applied to trees, one can build a frame in which the ‘unique root’ property fails or this
formula can be falsiﬁed.
The class of frames having at most n worlds (for each n 1) is characterized by
∨
0x<yn @ix i y , which is not preserved
by disjoint union. Thus, this class is not quasimodal.
Theorem 5.7 shows that among the frame classes that validate a given modal logic, any quasimodal classes remain
quasimodal when we add new frames to them. This is supported by an interesting behavior that can be observed with the
two latter classes of frames in the example just given. Indeed, any non-empty class of frames included in one of them is
not quasimodal (even if its modal logic is larger).
Let us prove this result for the class of trees. The proof is very similar for the class of frames of at most n worlds.
Let K be a non-empty class of frames included in the class of all trees. Thus, this class contains only trees, and formula
(@i  k ∧ @ j  k) → @i j is valid in it. However, one can, out of K , and with the three fundamental frame constructions,
build a frame that is not a tree. Thus, K is not quasimodal.
We might therefore conjecture that a class included in a non-quasimodal class of frames is not quasimodal. But this is wrong:
for instance, the class of frames with an empty relation is quasimodal (it is elementary and modally deﬁnable) and included
in the class of irreﬂexive frames, which is not quasimodal. A question that arises is: which conditions on a non-quasimodal
class are needed to make every (non-empty) subclass of it non-quasimodal? By Theorem 5.7, ‘any subclass of it has the
same modal logic’ is a suﬃcient condition, but are there more enlightening ones?
6. McKinsey–Lemmon and Hughes’s logics
The McKinsey–Lemmon and Hughes logics are remarkable modal logics that have been studied for a long time. They are
not ﬁnitely axiomatizable, each one is the logic of an elementary class of frames, and for each of these logics, the class of
frames validating it is not elementary.




KMT , or Hughes’s logic, introduced in [7], is the logic axiomatized by the following axioms:
((p1 → p1)∧ · · · ∧ (pn → pn)) (for each n 1).
It is the logic of both CT , the class of frames in which each world has a reﬂexive successor, and C∗T , the class of frames
validating KMT . CT is elementary and deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order sentence ∀x∃y(R(x, y)∧ R(y, y)). Hughes proved that KMT
is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable [7, Theorem 10] and that C∗T is not elementary [7, Theorem 11].
6.1.2. McKinsey–Lemmon logic
KM∞ , or the McKinsey–Lemmon logic, is axiomatized by the following axioms:
((p1 →p1)∧ · · · ∧ (pn →pn)) (for each n 1).
An early study of this logic is in [8, p. 74]. It is the logic of C∞ , the class of frames in which each world has a successor
with at most one successor, and C∗∞ , the class of frames validating KM∞ .
C∞ is deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order sentence ∀x∃y(R(x, y) ∧ ∀zt(R(y, z) ∧ R(y, t) → z = t)). On the other hand, C∗∞ is not
elementary. This has been proved independently, in [1, Theorem 21] and [5, Theorem 2.2], by the same argument, based on
one of van Benthem [11] for McKinsey’s formula p →p (which is equivalent to the instance for n = 1 of the above
axiom schema).
Goldblatt and Hodkinson [5, Corollary 4.5] show that KM∞ is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable.
6.2. Hybrid extensions of the McKinsey–Lemmon and Hughes logics
In this section, we shall prove that CT and C∗T on one hand, and C∞ and C∗∞ on the other hand, have the same hybrid
logic, and that these hybrid logics are quasimodal. We also prove that the hybrid logics of these classes are not ﬁnitely
axiomatizable.
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(i) CT and C∗T have the same hybrid logic, and are quasimodal.
(ii) C∞ and C∗∞ have the same hybrid logic, and are quasimodal.
Sketch of proof. (i) As CT is deﬁned as the class of frames in which each world has a reﬂexive successor, it is elementary,
and one can easily check that it is closed under bounded morphic images, disjoint unions and generated subframes. So we
can apply Theorem 5.4: CT is quasimodal. By deﬁnition, CT is included in C∗T , and they have the same modal logic, so we
can apply Theorem 5.7 to prove the ﬁrst part of this proposition.
(ii) The same proof applies for C∞ , as it is deﬁned as the class of frames in which each world has a successor with at
most one successor. 
We know that KMT and KM∞ are not ﬁnitely axiomatizable. We can wonder whether the hybrid operators we introduce
are suﬃcient to build a ﬁnite set of axioms that entails KMT and KM∞ . We show in Corollary 6.3 that this is not the
case: the hybrid logic of CT and C∗T (resp. C∞ and C∗∞), which is axiomatized by KMT ∪  (resp. KM∞ ∪ ), is not ﬁnitely
axiomatizable.
Lemma 6.2. Let α1,α2, . . . be modal formulas and suppose that for each n 1,
(i) αn+1 m αn,
(ii) there exists a frame Fn validating αn but not αn+1 .
Then the hybrid logic Θ axiomatized by {α1,α2, . . .} ∪ is not ﬁnitely axiomatizable.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that θ is an H(@)-formula that axiomatizes Θ . As θ is a theorem of Θ , there is n such
that {αn} h θ . As Fn |h αn , we have Fn |h θ . But {θ} h αn+1, so Fn |h αn+1, which is a contradiction. 
Corollary 6.3. HL(C∞) and HL(CT ) are not ﬁnitely axiomatizable.
Proof. Since both these logics are quasimodal, by [5, Lemmas 3.7–3.8] and [7, Theorem 7], HL(C∞) and HL(CT ) are axiom-
atized by  together with formulas αn with the above properties. So we can apply Lemma 6.2. 
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we axiomatized the hybrid logic of two kind of frames: elementary classes of frames, and quasimodal
classes of frames. Both these results used hybrid extensions, which we deﬁned and studied, building on the nice frames
of [10].
We axiomatized hybrid logics of elementary classes of frames, by applying [6] to the hybrid extension; this shows the
usefulness of these nice frames and of the hybrid extensions.
Quasimodal logics have then been studied for the purpose of separating the hybrid and modal parts of hybrid axioma-
tization. The general question we would like to answer is: given a hybrid logic, which is the modal part of this logic, and
which is the hybrid part? Quasimodal logics (and quasimodal classes) are the elements of the answer to this question in the
simplest case, where the hybrid component is reduced to the ﬁve axiom schemas deﬁning hybrid logic. However, it would
be interesting to continue this work (see further work below).
Finally, we studied the Hughes and McKinsey–Lemmon logics. Each of these modal logics is the logic of (at least) two
classes of frames, one elementary, and one non-elementary. We showed that the hybrid logics of these two classes are the
same: this means that hybrid logic does not seem to be powerful enough to differentiate these two classes of frames. We
also proved that these hybrid logics are not ﬁnitely axiomatizable. These two results, analogous to known modal results,
show that these logics might be as interesting in the hybrid case as they were in the modal case.
7.1. Further work
We give here some directions that we think may be interesting to investigate.
Can the hybrid operator ↓ be simulated by modalities, in a similar way to the modal simulation of @ in [10] and in
Section 3?
An idea is to consider, for a standard frame F, the disjoint union of the frames of the hybrid extension of {F} (the
class having only one frame F). We get a frame containing the disjoint union of all the possible valuations of F. Then, the
operator ↓ is simply a move from one subframe to another one having a different valuation.
We only dealt with frames having one unary modality . It may be of interest to extend the results of this paper to
arbitrary frames with many polyadic modalities.
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modal classes, we could not solve this problem.
We showed that one might have expected the statement “A class included in a class that is not quasimodal is not quasimodal
either” to be true. However, we showed that it is false. Can we ﬁnd a weaker, and true, version of this statement, such as
“A class included in a non-quasimodal class matching [some conditions] is not quasimodal”?
This is a problem totally different from the previous one we stated, but, given a ﬁnite set Γ of hybrid axioms, is the
problem “Is the hybrid logic axiomatized by Γ quasimodal?” decidable? If it is so, what is its complexity?
Quasimodal logics were what seemed the easiest way to separate hybrid axioms from modal axioms. Indeed, in quasi-
modal logics, we surely cannot remove the hybrid axioms, since they are the very deﬁnition of nominals and hybrid
operators.
It is possible to have a similar separation for a wider range of logics? Blackburn et al., in [3], studied the hybrid logic of
frames axiomatized by pure formulas (formulas not containing propositional variables, but only nominals). Although they
give an interesting result (the class of frames validating a set Π of pure formulas is axiomatized by the hybrid logic ∪Π ),
ﬁrst, they need to add extra rules to the logic, and second, we do not know if fewer hybrid axioms would be needed if we
added the entire modal logic as axioms. Can we ﬁnd a theorem without these extra rules? Can we prove something like:
The hybrid logic of a class of frames deﬁned by a set Π of pure formulas is axiomatized by its modal logic together with ∪Π?
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